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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter is being appealed from the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
Respondents Jack Cushman Drilling and Pump Company (hereinafter "Jack Cushman Drilling")
and Bob L. Cushman on the basis that there were material issues of fact surrounding the
construction and defects in a well which precluded summary judgment and the trial court's
determinations as a matter of law that the applicable statutes of limitations in tort and contract
had run and Appellant's claims were barred. It is also being appealed from the trial court's
determination that the claims against Bob L. Cushman as an individual should be dismissed.
Respondents disagree with Appellant's analysis of the case. First, there was no material
issue of fact as to when the well was constructed. Idaho Code section 5-241 controls when the
contract action accrued and began to run with respect to improvements to real property: at the
time of construction in August 2006. Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations for oral
contracts ran four years after the well was completed and Appellant's contract claim is barred.
Second, with respect to Appellant's cause of action in negligence, there is no dispute of
fact as to the nature of Appellant's claims - all based in economic loss - or when some of these
damages were first incurred: January 2007. Again, Appellant's argument is with the trial court's
application of the law to fact.
Finally, with respect to Appellant's claims against Bob L. Cushman, Appellant failed to
present any facts that would support the elements of his claim that Bob Cushman should be
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individually liable for alleged acts. Appellant now raises arguments that were not raised in the
trial court which Respondents argue should not be considered by this Court on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant and Respondents agree that the well that is the subject ofthis litigation was
constructed and completed in August 2006 under an oral contract. Appellant's Brief at 6;
Complaint at ~ 6, R. p. 5, at Ex. A, R. pp. 9-10; Answer and Jury Demand at ~ 5, R. p. 21;
Affidavit of Bob L. Cushman (hereinafter "Aff. Cushman") at ~ 6, R. p. 35. The evidence in the
record does not establish whether Respondent Bob L. Cushman was present during the time
when Respondent Jack Cushman Drilling was physically on-site and drilling the well, or what
part he may have played in supervising performance of the contract.
Appellant pleaded that "[s]ubsequent to the completion and drilling of the water well, the
plaintiff noticed the issues with the quality and quantity of water, including, but not limited to,
excessive sediment and very low water volume." Complaint at ~ 7, R. p. 7. "Plaintiff contacted
the defendants several time (sic), explaining the problem he was having, and asking them to
remedy the situation." Id. at ~ 7, R. p. 7.

The Complaint itself did not detail the dates of this

alleged contact. Attached to Appellant's Complaint at Exhibit "c" is the report of Appellant's
expert witness, Thomas Wood, of Clearwater Geosciences, LLP, which indicates that Appellant's
counsel represented that:
the owner contacted Cushman Drilling in January 2007 and many other times to report
that the #1 Well [as opposed to the replacement well] was producing green water and his
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water system was operating at low pressure. Cushman did not respond with corrective
actions to any of the requests. The situation of unacceptable well water went on for a
period of 4 years ....
Id. at Ex. C at 1, R. p. 15.

In their memorandum supporting their motion for summary judgment, Respondents cited
to the expert's statements regarding the January date. Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Memo. ISO MSJ") at 2, R. p. 29. In response, Appellant filed
an affidavit, which stated that he had contacted Respondent Bob Cushman and an electrician to
remedy these problems. Affidavit of Michael Stapleton (hereinafter "Aff. Stapleton") at ~~ 9-11,
R. p. 63. Appellant's affidavit alleges that Mr. Cushman stated that it was an electrical problem.
Jd. at ~ 10, R. p. 63. As a result, the Affiant alleged that he contacted an electrician, who stated

that a well driller needed to do any necessary work on the well. Jd. at

~

11, R. p. 63. Appellant

acknowledges that this contact occurred in January 2007. Appellant's Brief at 6-7.
The affidavit does not dispute or otherwise address the statements that Appellant
contacted Cushman Drilling or Bob Cushman "several time[ s]" after this initial contact. See Aff.
Stapleton, R. pp. 62-64. Mr. Stapleton's affidavit does not state that either the electrician or Mr.
Cushman allegedly told him that low water pressure or green sediment in the well was because
"the land was unfavorable to wells" because of "poor geology" or "an unfavorable aquifer" or the
weather caused the problems. See Appellant's Brief at 7-8, Aff. Stapleton, R. pp. 62-64. It does
not establish what Appellant's conclusions were at all regarding the cause of the alleged
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problems. See Aff. Stapleton, R. pp. 62-64. It does establish, however, that whatever the extent
ofthe construction ofMr. Stapleton's home, and regardless of when the home was actually
finally completed, Appellant was in a position in January 2007 to notice that there were problems
with the quality and quantity of water flowing from the well and took action to remedy these
problems. See id.
Appellant alleged that water stopped flowing from the well in Fall 2010. Id. at ~ 13, R. p.
63. Appellant claims that he then again contacted Respondents to remedy the problem. Id.
Appellant sometimes refers to alleged failure of the well in his appellate briefing as a
"collapse". See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at 8. However, despite the fact that this language may be
taken to imply subsidence of the land around the well, that has not been alleged by Appellant,
and damages that conceivably could result from subsidence were not alleged in the trial court.
See Complaint, R. pp. 4-8; Aff. Stapleton, R. pp. 62-64. Stapleton's counsel initially only

demanded damages for replacing the well. Brief in Response to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment at Ex. A, R. p. 61. Stapleton later alleged in his Affidavit that his damages
were incurred in: drilling a second well, tearing apart landscaping in order to drill a second well,
re-landscaping around the new well, destroying the old landscaping, paying for water due to loss
of use of the old well, and the costs of his time and travel to accomplish the replacement. Aff.
Stapleton at ~~ 15-16, R. p. 64.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this court applies the same
standard as does the trial court below. Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 259, 245 P.3d 1009, 1011
(2011). Specifically, summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, admissions
and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing IDAHO R. Crv. P. 56(c)). The
principle and purpose of a summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupportable claims. Sparks v. St. Lukes Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d
768 (1988). "If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of
law remains over which this Court exercises free review." Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 504,
112 PJd 788, 792 (2005).
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1. Whether the trial court erred by not applying Idaho Code section 5-241 in determining when
Appellant's contract action accrued and the four year limitation in Idaho Code section 5-217
began to run?
2. Whether the trial court properly decided that Appellant's cause of action in negligence accrued
no later that January 2007, or alternatively, whether the trial court erred in finding that a cause of
action had accrued?
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3. Whether the trial court properly decided that Appellant's claims against Respondent Bob L.
Cushman should be dismissed, and whether this Court should consider Appellant's argument on
this issue on appeal?
4. Whether Respondents are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?

ARGUMENT

1.
Whether the trial court erred by not clearly applying Idaho Code section 5-241 in
determining when Appellant's contract action accrued and the four year limitation in Idaho Code
section 5-217 began to run?
Appellant orally contracted with Respondent Cushman Drilling for the completion of a
well on unimproved land in Mackay, Idaho. Appellant's Brief at 6; Complaint at ~ 6, R. p. 5, at
Ex. A R. pp. 9-10; Answer and Jury Demand at ~ 5, R. p. 21; Affidavit of Bob L. Cushman
(hereinafter "Aff. Cushman") at ~ 6, R. p. 35. The parties agree that the well was constructed and
completed in August 2006. Id. Land is "real property". See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1254
(8 th Ed. 2004). A well is an "improvement" or "[a]n addition to real property, whether permanent
or not; esp., one that increases its value or utility .... " BLACK'S LA W DICTIONARY 773 (8 th Ed.
2004); cf Hibbler v. Fisher, 109 Idaho 1007,712 P.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1985) (discussing

application of statute in respect of claimed defects in water system). Idaho Code section 5-241
provides that "contract actions shall accrue and the applicable limitation statute shall begin to run
at the time of the final completion of construction of' any "improvement to real property,"
against "any person by reason of his having performed or furnished the design, planning,
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supervision or construction of[the] improvement." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-241 (b) (2010).
Corporations and individuals are "person[s]" under the statute. Id. Therefore, in determining
whether the statute oflimitations for Appellant's cause of action in contract had run, the Court
should have referred to the date the well was completed and determined that the contract cause of
action accrued in August 2006, and the statute ran in August 2010, long before Appellant filed
his Complaint in April 2011. Complaint at p. 1, R. p. 4.
While the trial court alluded to Respondents' argument that section 5-241 applied in this
case, it also applied reasoning which dated the accrual of the contract action to no later than
January 2007, when Appellant alleged he first discovered a breach in the contract because the
well was not functioning properly "and the fundamental purpose of the well had not been
satisfied." Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Order
Granting MSJ") at 11-12, R. pp. 82-83. It appears that Appellant's argument is that this latter
standard applies to the contract action, but that the court mis-applied the standard; he has argued
that the "contract could not have been breached until the home was completed" because that is
when the water would have been connected to the home, or alternati vely "[0 ]nly after
construction of the home and planting of the landscaping could it be determined whether
Cushman Drilling satisfied its obligation." Appellant's Brief at 12-13. Appellant also argues
that the breach did not occur until he discovered that the well has stopped producing water
aitogether in Fall 2010. Id. at 12.
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First, Idaho Code section 5-241 (b) does not require discovery of an alleged breach of a
contract for the statutes of limitations in section 5-217 to begin to run. It merely requires that
construction of the improvement is completed. In Barab v. Plumleigh, the Plaintiff-Appellant,
Barab, appealed from the trial court's dismissal of her "tort action for damages allegedly
resulting from the explosion ofa woodbuming stove." 123 Idaho 890, 891, 853 P.2d 635, 636
(Ct. App. 1993). The stove was fully installed in February 1982 into an existing propane line to a
log lighter device, but the propane tank that would fuel the log lighter was not put on line until
July 1982. Id. at 892, 853 P.2d at 636. The Plumleighs, who owned the vacation home, visited
it infrequently and did not use the log-lighter device, which was alleged to have caused the
explosion. Id. The builder, who installed the stove, did use the log-lighter device and the stove,
but with no problems. Id. The Plumleighs sold the home to Barab, who was injured in April
1990 by the explosion, and filed her Complaint in June 1990. Id.
The Court of Appeals analyzed the application of statute section 5-241(a), which states
that "the applicable limitation statute shall begin to run" if a tort action had not otherwise
accrued, "six (6) years after the final completion of construction of such an improvement." Id. at
*, 853 P.2d at 893. lithe applicable statute of limitations began to run at the February 1982
completion of construction - Barab's personal injury claim was time barred. Id. Although Barab
argued that the stove "was not 'finally completed' until the propane tank was delivered, attached
and filled with propane gas" in July 1982, and the Court of Appeals agreed that "the fueling of
the propane system was essential for the stove's log-lighter device to actually function", the
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Court nonetheless stated that "the statute is triggered by the completion of the improvement's

construction, not its readiness for actual use as urged by Barab." Id.

Because there was no

genuine issue of material fact with respect to when the stove was installed, the tort claim was
"time-barred and properly ... dismissed." Id.
Sub-section (a) of 5-241 uses the same language as sub-section (b) regarding what
triggers the limitation statute: "final completion of construction of such an improvement". See
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-241(a), (b) (2010). Regardless of when Appellant's residence was finally
completed and the well was in its fullest anticipated use, there is no dispute that the construction
of the well was completed in August 2006. Appellant's Brief at 6; Complaint at ~ 6, R. p. 5, at
Ex. A, R. pp. 9-10. The completion of the well triggered the four year limitation statute for oral
contracts, Idaho Code section 5-217, which ran in August 2010. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-217
(2010).
However, even if this Court were inclined to apply a rule which looked to the date when
the well was ready for actual use - that date was no later than January 2007. In August 2006 the
well was completed. By January 2007 the water system was sufficiently connected (not under
contract with Respondents) so that Plaintiff could determine that there were alleged defects in
water quality and flow, his expectations were not met and there was a breach in the contract.
Appellant admits that he contacted Respondent Bob Cushman and an electrician in January 2007
to remedy these problems. Aff. Stapleton at ~~ 9-11, R. p. 63; Appellant's Brief at 6-7. The
dismissal of Plaintiff s cause of action in contract should be upheld.
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2.

Whether the trial court properly decided that Appellant's cause of action in
negligence accrued no later that January 2007, or alternatively, whether the trial
court erred in finding that a cause of action had accrued at all.

Appellant argues that the trial court improperly determined that his cause of action in
negligence accrued in January 2007, citing Galbraith v. Vangas, Inc., and Stephens v. Stearns,
for the proposition that "the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a negligence
action until some damage has occurred" and arguing that damages to his property did not occur
until the well failed to function and his house and landscaping were completely deprived of water
despite the fact that alleged defects were found in the well in January 2007. Appellant's Brief at
18-19 (citing and quoting Galbraith v. Vangas, 103 Idaho 912, 655 P.2d 119 (et. App. 1982),

Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984».
To the extent that this "some damage" requires an injury actionable in tort, Respondents
argued in the trial cOUli, and continue to maintain, that Appellant's claimed damages are barred
by the economic loss rule in that they are all damages arising from the well's failure to perform
to the expectations of Appellant, and subsequent costs arising from the repair or replacement of
the well. See Memo ISO MSJ at 3-4, R. pp. 30-31; Reply ISO MSJ at 3-5, R. pp. 67-69.
Appellant claimed damages for the costs of drilling a second well, tearing apart the landscaping
to do so, putting in new landscaping, buying water for consumption, and his travel expenses.
Aff. Stapleton at ~~ 15-16, R. p. 64.
"Damages", in Galbraith, were damages caused to property directly from the explosion of
a propane water heater: "[i]n 1979, it exploded, destroying Galbraith's house, and damaging or
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destroying her personal property inside the house." 103 Idaho at 913, 655 P.2d at 120. The
injury in Stephens was alleged personal injury. 106 Idaho at 252, 678 P.2d at 44. The Galbraith
and Stephens injuries are clearly actionable in tort. Appellant's claimed injuries, however, are
damages arising from the alleged failure of the well to meet Appellant's expectations and costs
associated with its subsequent replacement. Aff. Stapleton at,-r,-r 15-16, R. p. 64. To the extent
that Appellant's claimed injuries do not trigger the running of a statute of limitations for tort, the
trial court erred in determining that a cause of action had accrued as a matter of law.
To the extent that economic damages do trigger the running of the statute oflimitations in
negligence, Appellant has admitted that he contacted both Respondents and an electrician in
January 2007 to address the alleged defects in the well. Aff. Stapleton at,-r 11, R. p. 63;
Appellant's Brief at 6-7.

While it may have been reasonable for the trial court to infer that

Appellant would not have paid Respondents to look at the cause of the low water flow and
excessive sediment in the water, it is not reasonable for the trial court to have assumed that the
electrician evaluated the well for free. It would also be unreasonable to for the trial court to infer
that the value of Appellant's improved (with the well) real property was not diminished by these
alleged defects in the well. Appellant sustained "some [economic] damage" in January 2007. In
this respect, this case is distinguishable from Galbraith in that while Galbraith arguably had
knowledge of the alleged defect in his boiler, she took no action to remedy it and therefore
incurred no expense. 103 Idaho at 913-14, 655 P.2d at 120-21. There were also no allegations
that the boiler's performance was diminished in any way by the alleged defect. See id
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Appellant's position is essentially that he accepted the patent defects in the well, and accepted
minor economic damages, the "some damage", in January 2007, but that this Court should
determine that no actionable injury occurred until more significant economic damages occurred.
3.

Whether the trial court properly decided that Appellant's claims against
Respondent Bob L. Cushman should be dismissed. and whether this Court should
consider Appellant's argument on this issue on appeal?

Appellant's Complaint does not distinguish between allegations against Respondent Jack
Cushman Drilling and Respondent Bob L. Cushman. See generally, Complaint, R. pp. 4-8. As
part of Respondents' motion for summary judgment, Respondent Bob L. Cushman moved the
trial court to dismiss the claims against him on the additional basis that Appellant had failed to
state a claim against him pursuant to I.R.C.P. l2(b)(6). Memo ISO MSJ at 5-6, R. pp. 32-33.
Appellant had not alleged facts in his Complaint, that if true, create a basis for a claim for Bob
Cushman's individual liability. Id. "An agent is only liable for actions which are outside [his]
scope of duty to the corporation." Cantwell v. City of Boise , 146 Idaho 127, l38 ,191 P.3d 205,
216 (2008) (citing Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Idaho, 123 Idaho 650, 654, 851
P.2d 946,948 (1993». Appellant did not allege that Bob Cushman was acting outside of the
scope of his duties to the corporation. See generally, Complaint, R. pp. 4-8; Memo ISO MSJ at
5-6, R. pp. 32-33.
Bob Cushman was at all times relevant to the Complaint an officer and employee of
Cushman Drilling and its agent. Memo ISO MSJ at 5-6, R. pp. 32-33; Aff. Cushman at 1-2, R.
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pp. 34-35. Appellant did not dispute this fact. See Brief in Response to MSJ at 1-20, R. pp. 4059. Appellant did not respond to the 12(b)(6) motion in his response briefing to the trial court.

See Register of Action at 1-3, R. pp. 1-3. Appellant did not file a motion to amend his
Complaint, nor did he file a motion to continue the hearing pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(e). Id. The
trial court noted Appellant's failure to argue material issues of fact or legal precedent which
"preclude the issuance of summary judgment". Order Granting MSJ at 13 (citing Esser Electric

v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 919,188 P.3d 854, 861 (2008)), R. p.
84.
Appellant now raises an argument which was not raised in the trial court: that Respondent
Bob Cushman's actions were "potentially illegal" in drilling the well. Appellant's Brief at 20-21.
To support this contention he cites the letter written by his expert, Clearwater Geosciences, LLP,
attached at exhibit "C" to the Complaint. Id. at 21. Respondents understand Appellant's
argument is that the trial court erred by failing to make inferences from the expert's opinion in
order to conclude that there was a material issue of fact which precluded summary judgment.
In Esser Electric the Court stated: "[t]he trial court is not required to search the record
looking for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact, the party opposing
summary judgment is required to bring that evidence to the court's attention." 145 Idaho at 919,
188 P.3d at 861 (citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Company v. First National Bank o/North Idaho,
118 Idaho 812, 800 P .2d 1026 (1990)). The Esser court declined to consider an appeal whether
the district court erred in failing to discover facts in the record which precluded summary
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judgment when the appellant failed to argue those facts. Id. at 919-20, 188 P.3d at 861-62. On
this basis, Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in failing to discover facts in this record
should not be considered, and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
Additionally, there are several other reasons the trial court should be affirmed and
Appellant's argument fails. First, the expert's report at exhibit "C" is not his sworn statement.

See IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(e). Second, the report at exhibit "C" to Appellant's Complaint does not
discuss Bob Cushman's actions at all- it addresses the alleged actions of Respondent Jack
Cushman Drilling. Complaint at Ex. C, R. pp. 15-18. Therefore there is nothing in the report
that could be inferred regarding Mr. Cushman's actions as an individual. Third, neither the
Complaint nor Appellant's Affidavit suggest that Appellant has knowledge regarding whether
Mr. Cushman was even present whileJhe well was drilled or directed the actual work. However,
even if Appellant had personal knowledge regarding these facts, Appellant's expert's knowledge
of the same would be hearsay and inadmissable to prove the truth of the matter.

IDAHO

R. EVID.

801, 802. Respondents did not have the opportunity to object at the trial court level. Fourth,
even if there was a statement in these documents regarding Mr. Cushman's individual actions in
constructing the well, Appellant does not explain how the expert's statement that a well was
improperly and perhaps illegally constructed would place Respondent Bob Cushman's actions
outside of the scope of his duties as to the drilling company. For all of the above reasons, the
trial court should be affirmed in its dismissal of Bob L. Cushman from this suit.
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ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
4.

This Court should award Respondents attorney fees and costs
Respondents were awarded attorney fees and costs at the trial court level pursuant to

Idaho Code section 12-120(3) as the prevailing parties on Appellant's causes of action in contract
and in tort arising out of a commercial transaction. See Motion to Augment. Appellant opposed,
but has not appealed, this award. Id. Idaho Code section 12-120(3) provides for the award of
reasonable attorney fees at both the trial level and on appeal. See Esser Electric v. Lost River
Ballistic Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 921, 188 P.3d 854, 863 (2008). Costs and
reasonable attorneys fees are awardable to the prevailing party pursuant to Idaho R. App. P. 40,
41.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Appellant's appeal should be denied and Respondents
awarded their costs and attorney fees.
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this 2nd day of February, 2012.

CAREY PERKINS LLP

By:
Dina L. Sallak, of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
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